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Abstract Ehlers and Klaus (Int J Game Theory 32:545–560, 2003) study so-called
allocation problems and claim to characterize all rules satisfying efficiency, indepen-
dence of irrelevant objects, and resource-monotonicity on two preference domains
(Ehlers and Klaus 2003, Theorem 1). They explicitly prove Theorem 1 for preference
domain R0 which requires that the null object is always the worst object and mention
that the corresponding proofs for the larger domain R of unrestricted preferences “are
completely analogous.” In Example 1 and Lemma 1, this corrigendum provides a
counterexample to Ehlers and Klaus (2003, Theorem 1) on the general domain R. We
also propose a way of correcting the result on the general domain R by strengthening
independence of irrelevant objects: in addition to requiring that the chosen allocation
should depend only on preferences over the set of available objects (which always
includes the null object), we add a situation in which the allocation should also be
invariant when preferences over the null object change. Finally, we offer a short proof
of the corrected result that uses the established result of Theorem 1 for the restricted
domain R0.
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1 House allocation with variable resources
For completeness and the convenience of the reader, we briefly state the model and
the main result of Ehlers and Klaus (2003).
Let N denote a finite set of agents, |N | ≥ 2. Let K denote a set of potential real
objects. Not receiving any real object is called “receiving the null object.” Let 0 repre-
sent the null object. Each agent i ∈ N is equipped with a preference relation Ri over
all objects K ∪ {0}. Given x, y ∈ K ∪ {0}, x Ri y means that agent i weakly prefers
x to y, and x Pi y means that agent i strictly prefers x to y. We assume that Ri is
strict, i.e., Ri is a linear order over K ∪ {0}. Let R denote the class of all linear orders
over K ∪ {0}, and RN the set of (preference) profiles R = (Ri )i∈N such that for all
i ∈ N , Ri ∈ R. Given K ′ ⊆ K ∪ {0}, let Ri |K ′ denote the restriction of Ri to K ′ and
R|K ′ = (Ri |K ′)i∈N . Let R0  R denote the class of preference relations where the
null object is the worst object. That is, if Ri ∈ R0, then all real objects are “goods”:
for all x ∈ K , x Pi 0.
An allocation is a list a = (ai )i∈N such that for all i ∈ N , ai ∈ K ∪ {0}, and
none of the real objects in K is assigned to more than one agent. Note that 0, the
null object, can be assigned to any number of agents and that not all real objects have
to be assigned. Let A denote the set of all allocations. Let H denote the set of all
non-empty subsets H of K . A (house allocation) problem consists of a preference
profile R ∈ RN and a set of real objects H ∈ H. Note that the associated set of
available objects H ∪ {0} includes the null object which is available in any economy.
An (allocation) rule is a function ϕ : RN × H → A such that for all problems
(R, H) ∈ RN ×H, ϕ(R, H) ∈ A is feasible, i.e., for all i ∈ N , ϕi (R, H) ∈ H ∪ {0}.
By feasibility, each agent receives an available object. Given i ∈ N , we call ϕi (R, H)
the allotment of agent i at ϕ(R, H).
A natural requirement for a rule is that the chosen allocation depends only on
preferences over the set of available objects.
Independence of irrelevant objects: For all (R, H) ∈ RN × H and all R′ ∈ RN
such that R|H∪{0} = R′|H∪{0}, ϕ(R, H) = ϕ(R′, H).
Next, a rule chooses only (Pareto) efficient allocations.
Efficiency: For all (R, H) ∈ RN × H, there is no feasible allocation a ∈ A such that
for all i ∈ N , ai Ri ϕi (R, H), with strict preference holding for some j ∈ N .
A rule satisfies resource-monotonicity, if more resources become available, all
agents (weakly) gain.
Resource-monotonicity: For all R ∈ RN and all H, H ′ ∈ H, if H ⊆ H ′, then for all
i ∈ N , ϕi (R, H ′) Ri ϕi (R, H).
2 Mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rules
Mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rules are defined via the use of “(endowment) inher-
itance tables” (Pápai 2000). For each real object x ∈ K , a one-to-one function πx :
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{1, . . . , |N |} → N specifies the inheritance of object x . An inheritance table is a pro-
file π = (πx )x∈K specifying the inheritance of each real object. We call an inheritance
table π a mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange inheritance table if it induces a partition
of agents into singletons and pairs S = (S1, . . . , Sm) and the corresponding mixed
dictator-pairwise-exchange inheritance rule ϕ(π,S) works as follows (see Ehlers and
Klaus 2003, Sect. 3 for details).
First, if S1 is a singleton, then the agent who initially owns all objects picks his
best available object. If S1 specifies a pair of agents, the two agents who initially own
all objects obtain their best objects if these are different; otherwise whoever owns the
(common) best available object is assigned that object, and the other agent picks his
best available object from the remaining objects. This process of either dictatorship or
pairwise-exchange steps is repeated with S2, S3, etc. for the set of remaining available
objects after each step.
For a formal definition of mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange inheritance table we
refer to Ehlers and Klaus (2003).
Theorem 1 Ehlers and Klaus (2003, Theorem 1)
Let |K | > |N |. On the domain RN (RN0 ), mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rules are
the only rules satisfying efficiency, independence of irrelevant objects, and resource-
monotonicity.
3 Problems concerning Theorem 1 on domain R
3.1 Counterexample to Theorem 1
Example 1 Let N = {1, 2, 3}, x ∈ K , and |K | ≥ 4. Rule ϕ is defined as follows: for
all (R, H) ∈ RN × H,
(a) if x ∈ H, x P2 0, and x is what agents 1 and 3 prefer most in H , the serial
dictatorship corresponding to the order (3, 1, 2) is used; and
(b) otherwise the serial dictatorship corresponding to the order (1, 3, 2) is used.
Note that ϕ is not a mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rule because for any problem
(R, H) such that x ∈ H is what agents 1 and 3 prefer most in H , we haveϕ3(R, H) = x
if x P2 0 and ϕ1(R, H) = x if 0 P2 x .
Lemma 1 A counterexample to Theorem 1 on Domain R
Rule ϕ as defined in Example 1 satisfies efficiency, independence of irrelevant objects,
and resource-monotonicity.
Proof It is obvious that rule ϕ as defined in Example 1 satisfies efficiency and indepen-
dence of irrelevant objects. In order to check resource-monotonicity, let R ∈ RN and
H, H ′ ∈ H be such that H ⊆ H ′. If (R, H) and (R, H ′) are both of type (a) (or both
of type (b)), then resource-monotonicity is satisfied by ϕ because serial dictatorship
rules are resource-monotonic.
We are left with the case where (R, H) and (R, H ′) are not of the same “type” (a)
or (b).
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First, suppose that (R, H) is of type (a) and (R, H ′) is of type (b). Then, by definition
of ϕ, ϕ3(R, H) = x . Now, if ϕ3(R, H ′) = x , then resource-monotonicity is satisfied
because the order in the serial dictatorship between agents 1 and 2 is unchanged in (a)
and (b). Otherwise ϕ3(R, H ′) = x and because (R, H ′) is of type (b), at ϕ(R, H ′)
agent 1 or agent 3 receives an object in H ′ \ H and the other agent either receives x
or also an object in H ′ \ H . Now, resource-monotonicity is satisfied because agents 1
and 3 are weakly better off and agent 2 can choose from a larger set of objects under
(R, H ′) than under (R, H).
Second, suppose that (R, H) is of type (b) and (R, H ′) is of type (a). Then, by
definition of ϕ, ϕ3(R, H ′) = x . Since (R, H) is of type (b) and (R, H) not of type
(a), we must have x ∈ H ′ \ H . Then, ϕ3(R, H ′) R3 ϕ3(R, H) and both agents 1
and 2 can choose from a larger set of objects at (R, H ′) than at (R, H). Since the
order in the serial dictatorship between agents 1 and 2 is unchanged in (a) and (b),
resource-monotonicity is satisfied. 	unionsq
3.2 Correction of Theorem 1
In order to correct Theorem 1 on domain RN , we strengthen independence of irrele-
vant objects by additionally requiring that if only the ranking of the null object changes
below agents’ allotments, then the allocation does not change.
Strong independence of irrelevant objects: For all (R, H) ∈ RN × H and all
R′ ∈ RN such that
(i) R|H∪{0} = R′|H∪{0} or
(ii) R|H = R′|H and for all i ∈ N , ϕi (R, H) Pi 0 implies ϕi (R, H) P ′i 0,
we have ϕ(R, H) = ϕ(R′, H).
We are now ready to present a correction of Theorem 1 on Domain R.
Theorem 2 Let |K | > |N |. On the domain RN , mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange
rules are the only rules satisfying efficiency, strong independence of irrelevant objects,
and resource-monotonicity.
We next offer a short proof of Theorem 2 that uses the established result of Ehlers
and Klaus (2003, Theorem 1) for the restricted domain RN0 .
Before proving Theorem 2, we establish two useful implications of efficiency and
resource-monotonicity.
The following lemma states that efficiency and resource-monotonicity imply that tak-
ing out an unassigned object does not change the assigned allocation.
Lemma 2 Let ϕ be an efficient and resource-monotonic rule and (R, H) ∈ RN ×H.
If for all i ∈ N , ϕi (R, H) = x ∈ H, then ϕ(R, H) = ϕ(R, H \ {x}).
Proof Suppose by contradiction that (R, H) ∈ RN × H is such that for all i ∈
N , ϕi (R, H) = x ∈ H and ϕ(R, H) = ϕ(R, H \ {x}). Note that object x is nei-
ther assigned at (R, H) nor at (R, H \ {x}), i.e., ϕ(R, H) is feasible for (R, H \ {x}).
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Hence, by efficiency, there exists an agent j ∈ N such that ϕ j (R, H\{x})Pj ϕ j (R, H),
contradicting resource-monotonicity. 	unionsq
The following lemma states that efficiency and resource-monotonicity imply that add-
ing an object that none of the agents who are assigned objects would prefer will not
change the assigned allocation for these agents. For (R, H) ∈ RN × H, we denote
the set of agents who are assigned objects in H at ϕ(R, H) by N+(ϕ, R, H) ≡ {i ∈
N : ϕ(R, H) ∈ H}.
Lemma 3 Let ϕ be an efficient and resource-monotonic rule and (R, H) ∈ RN ×H.
Let x ∈ K \ H and for all i ∈ N+(ϕ, R, H), ϕi (R, H) Pi x. Then, for all i ∈
N+(ϕ, R, H), ϕi (R, H) = ϕi (R, H ∪ {x}).
Proof Let (R, H) ∈ RN ×H, x ∈ K \H and for all i ∈ N+(ϕ, R, H), ϕi (R, H)Pi x .
By resource-monotonicity, for all i ∈ N+(ϕ, R, H), ϕi (R, H ∪ {x}) Ri ϕi (R, H).
Hence, object x at (R, H ∪ {x}) is not assigned to any agent in N+(ϕ, R, H) (it
might be assigned to any of the agents who did not receive an object). Since ϕ(R, H)
is efficient and only agents in N+(ϕ, R, H) received objects in H , the only way to
satisfy resource-monotonicity is to not change the assigned allocation for agents in
N+(ϕ, R, H), i.e., for all i ∈ N+(ϕ, R, H), ϕi (R, H) = ϕi (R, H ∪ {x}). 	unionsq
3.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Throughout the proof, when referring to Ehlers and Klaus (2003, Theorem 1), we refer
to Ehlers and Klaus (2003, Theorem 1) on the domain RN0 .
It is easy to verify that mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rules satisfy efficiency,
strong independence of irrelevant objects, and resource-monotonicity since no more
than two agents “trade” at any step. In proving the converse, let |K | > |N | and
let ϕ be a rule satisfying efficiency, strong independence of irrelevant objects, and
resource-monotonicity.
By Ehlers and Klaus (2003, Theorem 1), ϕ equals a mixed dictator-pairwise-
exchange rules on the domain RN0 . Hence, on the domain RN0 , ϕ = ϕ(π,S). Sup-
pose, by contradiction, that on the general domain RN , ϕ = ϕ(π,S). Then, there exists
(R, H) ∈ RN × H such that ϕ(R, H) = ϕ(π,S)(R, H). In particular, by efficiency,
there exists j ∈ N such that ϕ j (R, H) Pj ϕ(π,S)j (R, H).
Let
(⋃
i∈N {ϕi (R, H)}
) \ {0} = H ′. By Lemma 2, for all i ∈ N , ϕi (R, H ′) =
ϕi (R, H). By resource-monotonicity of ϕ(π,S) and H ′ ⊆ H, ϕ(π,S)j (R, H) R j
ϕ
(π,S)
j (R, H
′). Thus, ϕ j (R, H ′) Pj ϕ(π,S)j (R, H ′) and at ϕ(R, H ′) all real objects
are assigned. To simplify notation, and without loss of generality, we assume that
H ′ = H in the sequel.
Case 1 (|H | = |N |): If |H | = |N |, then we move the null object to the bottom of
each agent’s preference relation and obtain a profile R′ ∈ RN0 . Formally, let R′ be
such that R′|H = R|H and for all i ∈ N and all x ∈ H, x P ′i 0. Note that for all
i ∈ N , ϕi (R, H) = 0 and by efficiency, for all i ∈ N , ϕi (R, H) Pi 0. Using (ii)
in strong independence of irrelevant objects we then have ϕ(R, H) = ϕ(R′, H). By
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R′ ∈ RN0 and Ehlers and Klaus (2003, Theorem 1), ϕ(R′, H) = ϕ(π,S)(R′, H). Then,
ϕ(R, H) = ϕ(R′, H) = ϕ(π,S)(R′, H) implies that for all i ∈ N , ϕ(π,S)i (R, H) Pi 0
and ϕ(π,S)i (R, H) P ′i 0. Using (ii) in strong independence of irrelevant objects we
then have ϕ(π,S)(R′, H) = ϕ(π,S)(R, H). Hence, ϕ(R, H) = ϕ(π,S)(R, H); a
contradiction to ϕ j (R, H) Pj ϕ(π,S)j (R, H).
Case 2 (|H | < |N |): If |H | < |N |, then let l ∈ N be such that ϕl(R, H) = 0. Let
x ∈ K \ H and change agents’ preferences from R to R′ ∈ RN such that
(i) R′|H∪{0} = R|H∪{0},
(ii) agent l ranks x just above 0, i.e., x P ′l 0 and for no y ∈ H, x P ′l y P ′l 0, and
(iii) all other agents, rank x worst, i.e., for all i ∈ N \{l} and all y ∈ H ∪{0}, y P ′i x .
By (i) of strong independence of irrelevant objects, ϕ(R′, H) = ϕ(R, H) and
ϕ(π,S)(R′, H) = ϕ(π,S)(R, H). Hence, ϕl(R′, H) = 0. Furthermore, there exists
j ∈ N such that ϕ j (R′, H) P ′j ϕ(π,S)j (R′, H).
Resource-monotonicity implies that for all i ∈ N , ϕi (R′, H ∪ {x}) R′i ϕi (R′, H).
Now by construction and efficiency, ϕl(R′, H ∪ {x}) = x and for all i ∈ N \
{l}, ϕi (R′, H ∪ {x}) = ϕi (R′, H).
If ϕ(π,S)l (R
′, H) = 0, then the same arguments as above imply ϕ(π,S)l (R′, H ∪
{x}) = x and for all i ∈ N \ {l}, ϕ(π,S)i (R′, H ∪ {x}) = ϕ(π,S)i (R′, H). Now if
ϕ
(π,S)
l (R
′, H) = 0, then Lemma 3 implies that ϕ(π,S)(R′, H ∪ {x}) = ϕ(π,S)(R′, H).
Hence, we have that ϕ j (R′, H ∪{x}) P ′j ϕ(π,S)j (R′, H ∪{x}) and
( ⋃
i∈N {ϕi (R′, H ∪
{x})}) \ {0} = H ∪ {x}. If for some l ′ ∈ N , ϕl ′(R′, H ∪ {x}) = 0, then we repeat the
Case 2 step above by adding an object x ′ ∈ K \ (H ∪ {x}) etc.
Repeating this step will eventually lead to a problem (R˜, H˜) where ϕ j (R˜, H˜) P˜j
ϕ
(π,S)
j (R˜, H˜) and for all i ∈ N , ϕi (R˜, H˜) = 0. But then, |H˜ | = |N | and we can apply
the arguments of Case 1 to obtain a contradiction. 	unionsq
Remark 1 (|K | ≤ |N |) The following example demonstrates that the statement of
Ehlers and Klaus (2003, p. 552) “For the larger domain R, all our results remain true.”
concerning the adjustment of results for |K | ≤ |N | is not correct. Let N = {1, 2, 3}
and K = {x}. Rule ϕ is defined as follows: for all (R, H) ∈ RN × H,
(a) if x P3 0, the serial dictatorship corresponding to the order (1, 2, 3) is used; and
(b) if 0 P3 x , the serial dictatorship corresponding to the order (2, 1, 3) is used.
Note that ϕ is not a mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rule, but it satisfies efficiency,
strong independence of irrelevant objects, and resource-monotonicity.
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